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Abstract 
Leveraged buyouts (LBOs) and their effect on the economy (following their history that started in 1919 with the first LBO 
of Ford Motor Company) cannot be adequately discussed without taking into consideration the junk bonds. The reason for 
this necessary linkage is directly connected with the power that rests in the junk bonds, because they are used to finance 
LBO deals. The original-issue high-yield debt instrument, the so-called “junk bond” innovation, was pioneered by Michael 
Milken of Drexel Burnham, providing many hostile bidders and LBO firms with the enormous amounts of capital needed to 
finance multi-billion-dollar deals. The history of these two instruments goes hand in hand, as for example, the conjunction 
between the U.S. recession of the early 1990s along with the junk bond market crash following the fall of the investment 
bank Drexel Burnham Lambert, brought the first LBO wave (the one that started in 1980) to an end. This is not the only 
example that shows a true connection between LBOs and junk bonds. This paper aims to bring into light the liaison that 
exists between these two instruments and the history that was created by the financing of LBOs with junk bonds. The 
present article will bring into focus the speculations that rests on the idea that the junk bonds has proven to be a life saver to 
big leveraged buyout groups as companies are able to get access to funding as investors look to invest in companies with 
high yields. Apart from this subject, this paper will try to figure out the role that the junk bond market plays in new LBO’s, 
especially the ones created after 2012 (there was a slowdown in the LBOs activity after the financial turnover from 2008, 
and only after 2012 we can observe an improvement in the leveraged buyout market). This research paper will try to 
stimulate thinking about the effects that are generated on a market by a LBO, the power that exists behind a leveraged 
buyout (e.g. the junk bonds) and the connection that makes them prevail and become powerful, mainly together. 
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1. Main text  
The existing academic literature and its further expanding on the subject of corporate finance does not 
agreed upon a precise definition of the terminology of a leveraged buyout (LBO). An early definition of this 
concept stated that a LBO is “a transaction in which a group of private investors uses debt to purchase a 
corporation or a corporate division” (Palepu, 1990). These private investors consist of the management of the 
target company, a single or a consortium of private equity firm(s) and, often, third-party investors. Their 
purpose is to obtain an important part of the bought-out company.  
One of the core characteristics of LBOs is the substantial debt financing against the target company’s assets 
from “banks and from buyers of subordinated public debt, which in the 1980s became known as junk bonds” 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). But, there is great doubt regarding the notion of a leveraged buyout: “The greatest 
ambiguity about what constitutes an LBO concerns the degree to which the purchase is financed with debt” 
(Garfinkel, 1989). The author also states that debt finance provides about 80% to 90% of the funds needed for 
the purchase. Other authors consider a 85% to be the figure for the debt financing (Easterwood et al., 1989). A 
more generous percentage is given by (Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009) who are arguing that a “buyout is 
typically financed with anywhere from 60 to 90 percent debt”. Other sources qualify a transaction as being 
leveraged (eg. highly leveraged) when at least 50 percent of the total sources of the acquisition are financial 
liabilities (FASB, 1988). A leveraged buyout is financed both with equity and debt, consisting therefore from a 
considerable share of debt (or other debt-like instruments). At the beginning of the LBO phenomenon, one of 
the key factors was the ability to receive financing for companies below investment grade rating, commonly 
referred to as junk bonds (they also received names such as “securities swill” or “toxic waste”) . Similar 
considerations were subject to the definition of “highly leveraged transactions” (HLT) by the US authorities 
under the auspices of the Federal Reserve Board to mitigate the advancing default risk. One of the guidelines 
related to the capital structure demands that the financing either doubles the borrower’s liabilities and results in 
a leverage ratio greater than 50%, or increases the leverage ratio higher than 75%  (Lenz, 2010). High-yield 
bonds in LBO financing can be structured in a variety of forms but most frequently have a maturity of seven to 
ten years, bear annual cash-interest payments and are fully repaid at term (Pindur, 2007). The junk bonds were 
the fastest growing financial instruments in the US capital markets in the 1980s and they are still the most 
controversial tool. 
The 80s witnessed a vast attention given to the junk bond concept by the writers and the fund managers 
diversified their portfolios into this friendly financial instrument (the same appreciation of the instrument can be 
found in Levine, 2012). Investors found the junk bonds as being attractive because they could be resold in a 
liquid secondary market (Taggart, 1988). But in the spring and summer of 1989 the bubble burst and the issuers 
of junk bonds began to default as they were sliding into an inevitable faith: bankruptcy.  Suddenly, the junk 
bonds became a negative instrument (Edward et al., 1987; Bruck, 1989; Yago, 1991; Zey, 1993; Yago and 
Trimbath, 2003) that brought various outcomes for the junk bond issuers: they faced cash problems that arise 
sooner or later. The connection between high yield bonds and the wave of corporate restructuring has placed the 
junk bonds and the people who crafted and marketed them at centre stage. More attention raised the securities 
investigation of Drexel Burnham Lambert and Michael Milken (the controversial financial innovator also 
known as “The Junk Bond King” who made millions of dollars for himself and his Wall Street firm by 
specializing in bonds issued by “fallen angels” ) resulted in a settlement of $650 million by Drexel Burnham 
and the indictment of Milken. The Wall Street history witnessed its largest bankruptcy in February 1990 when 
Drexel Burnham, built mostly with high yield bonds, collapsed.  
Following a period of stagnation also on the leveraged buyouts market and in the academic literature for this 
subject, the literature review guides us towards the 2007s, when we experienced a credit crisis, when the 
subprime mortgage market began to fall down. After the rescue of Bear Stearns by J.P.Morgan with 
government assistance, the financial market meltdown has started from 2008 (Maxwell and Shenkman, 2010).  
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The presented study’s research approach is of an exploratory nature and it is motivated by the relatively rare 
total value research in the area of finance and strategic management regarding the leveraged buyouts, especially 
in terms of performance and relationship with the junk bonds phenomenon. One of the key reasons for the lack 
of studies in this area was the traditional difficulty of accessing data. Most studies on this topic have been 
published in the 80s and early 90s, when the LBO phenomenon has become a matter of public and academic 
interest. Moreover, the dual and contradictory approach regarding the positive and negative influence of the 
junk bonds power in a LBO supported the motivation for this paper. 
2. The Historical Evidence 
The LBOs came to fame during the 1980s in the United States when they contributed as a major ingredient 
to the hostile takeover boom at that time. While the LBOs activity has increased in that decade, (Jensen, 1989a) 
predicted that companies purchased the debt will become, finally, the dominant form of corporate organization. 
Jensen argued that the LBO type of organizations combine significant concentration of ownership stakes, 
management performance based, highly leveraged capital structures and active governance conducted by the 
private companies that invest in them. According to Jensen, these structures are superior to typical public 
corporations that have dispersed shareholders, a low leverage and weak corporate governance.  
The American corporate sector had experienced a dramatic increase in leveraged buyout activity between 
1979 and 1989 with over 2,000 LBOs valued in excess of $250 billion (Opler and Titman, 1993). The new 
phenomenon reaches a pick in 1989, when Private Equity firm Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts acquired RJR-
Nabisco for $25 billion in a leveraged buyout takeover, a transaction almost double the size of the largest 
previous acquisition to that date, the $13.2 billion Chevron purchase of Gulf Oil in 1985 (Jensen, 1989b).  
A few years later, Jensen’s prediction seemed premature. The extraordinary returns on early LBO 
investments had led to an inflow of large amounts of capital from investors into LBO funds (Kaplan and Stein, 
1993). Both the number of transactions and the average size of the deals had increased significantly during the 
‘80s. However, capital market turbulence in the late 1980s, especially following the Black Monday on 19th 
October 1987, as well as changes in the financial market environment and defaults of a range of highly levered 
target companies led to a rapid decline of leveraged buyout activity as well as a breakdown of the associated 
high yield (or junk) bond market until 1990-1991 (Kester and Luehrman, 1995; Allen, 1996). The global stock 
markets crash from October 1989 and the recessionary economic development until the end of the first Iraq war 
in 1992 prompted an abrupt end to the positive and growing fundraising climate. Therefore, the high-yield 
bonds market collapsed, and a large number of LBOs were led to bankruptcy; moreover, the public companies 
LBOs (the so-called public-private transactions) disappeared in the early ‘90s. 
There is a considerable wide belief that junk bonds put a crushing burden on leveraged buyouts, but the 
evidence indicates otherwise. It demonstrates that the added debt offers additional incentives to management to 
reduce costs and improve performance in key areas. Contrary to the popular belief, the junk bonds have not 
primarily been used to fund hostile takeovers, but to generate economic value through aggressive business 
development strategies. (Yago, 1991) The junk bonds were associated with rapid growth in sales, productivity, 
employment and capital spending. Therefore, what seemed to be the death of the LBO expansion was instead a 
helpful instrument for the high yield firms that gained an advantage in terms of performance. Junk bonds were 
not harmful for the American economy, but they supported and developed it in regards of productivity, gains, 
efficiency and expansion.  
Apart from all the above, it would be a great mistake not to mention the fact that the connection between the 
leveraged buyouts and the junk bonds was realised before the 1980s events. The high-risk bond and the LBOs 
relationship is dating back in 1901 when J. P. Morgan realised the merger of eight steel companies at a cost of $ 
1.4 billion, more than a third of this money being took on debt (Anders, 1988). 
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3. The Holistic Evidence 
Through a quantitative research and review of data, we can observe a variation in rating class within the 
high yield market during decades, variation that is directly linked to the LBO phenomenon. Table 1 shows the 
fluctuation over time of the junk bonds from twenty years from 1986, according to Credit Suisse bond ratings. 
For example, if we compare the 1986 situation with the reality from 1991, we can observe an inversion in terms 
of a higher rating awarded to the B bonds in the first analyses year (29.9% were BB bonds and the majority, 
63.3% were rated B bonds) in comparison with the previous year when the BB hold the majority (76.9% of 
high-yield bonds issued were rated BB and only 12.8% were rated B)  
 
Table 1. High Yield New Issues by Rating (1986 – 2006) 
 
High Yield Bond Rating 1986 1991 1996 2001 2006 
BB 29.9 % 76.9% 34.5% 55% 38.9% 
B 63.3 12.8% 59.5% 43.1% 53.2% 
CCC 1.8% 0% 0.8% 1.1% 7.7% 
 
Source: Credit Suisse 
 
As all data confirm the evidences presented in the historical part, by observing the activity of LBOs and 
Mergers & Acquisitions from Fig. 1. we can affirm that during periods of increased buyouts (between 1986 and 
1991), companies find their funding at the lower end of the rating spectrum. Also, during times with higher 
defaults, firms may encounter difficulties in issuing debt in the lowest rating classes, such as B and below.  
Fig. 1. Completed Mergers & Acquisitions and Leveraged Buyouts (1981-1996), Source: Data collected from Baker and Smith (1998) 
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After the events from early 1990s, the market of junk bonds was exhausted and later in that decade, 
experiencing economic prosperity and being less liquid after the Drexel Burnham event, the junk bonds were 
blooming again. The default rates climbed after 1990, reaching 10.3% in 1991 (Altman and Fanjul, 2004). But, 
once more their reign was about to end. So, in 2001, 11% of U.S. junk bond issues defaulted (Brealey et al., 
2011) and companies owning junk bonds faced again difficult times. 
4. The junk bonds and LBOs current trends 
Nowadays, there are big leveraged buyout groups that have gained access to private equity funds that have 
succeeded by selling junk bonds lately, such as Caesars Entertainment (in the 3rd quarter of 2013 had a $2.15 
billion offering backing a debt repurchase) and Dell (in September 2013, Dell priced its $1.5 billion offering 
backing its LBO by private equity concern Silver Lake). Three top loan issuers are rated below B and all three 
are a result from LBOs. On the other hand, two of the top 10 biggest high-yield bond issuers are companies that 
were previously rated as “fallen angels”. Moreover, we can observe in Table 2 that 7 of the top 10 high-yield 
loan issuers are from leveraged buyouts, and only 2 of the top 10 high-yield bond issuers have origins in the 
same category. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Top 10 High Yield Issuers (2012) 
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In 2012, the junk bond funds witnessed an injection of capital, cash that has to be invested in new deals. The 
capital markets have reopened to highly indebted companies after central banks moved to keep official rates 
low and sentiment in US and European markets has improved (Bullock and Thomas, 2012). Given the generous 
yields available from the high yield sector and the current low level of defaults, investors may prefer high yield 
over investment grade, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
 
Fig. 3. The spread between the yield of the J.P. Morgan Domestic High Yield Index and the yield on comparable maturity Treasury bonds 
 
As we can observe from Table 3, the volume of junk bonds issued to support the LBOs has witnessed, at a 
global level, an increase after the financial crisis. Even if the amounts of bond issued in US is much bigger than 
in Europe, there is a massive increase last year, with more than 150%. Therefore, there is hope that Europe will 
emerge slowly from its recessionary, forecasting that in 2014 no significant global shocks will derail its 
recovery. However, the economic growth will be modest, with strong regional variations as the euro area 
periphery remains weak (Moody’s Global Credit Research, 2013). 
Table 2. The volume of high yield bonds issued to endorse the LBOs (2005-2013) 
 US ($B) Europe ($B) Global ($B) 
2005 21,2141 NA NA 
2006 34,4500 7,2670 43,6534 
2007 50,8355 5,2064 57,8476 
2008 28,9730 0,1500 29,1558 
2009 0 0 0 
2010 13,7200 1,6981 16,0213 
2011 15,4970 2,9917 19,6997 
2012 19,5320 2,4096 22,6294 
2013 16,6400 6,3798 25,1187 
Source: Standard’s and Poor’s Note: The credit crisis halted the M&A activity in 2009 and there was zero high yield issuance for 
supporting the LBOs 
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5. Conclusion 
In the 1980s, high yield securities played a constructive role in enabling the restructuring of companies in 
various key industries and the outbreak of a new wave of firms that were to operate in new and innovative 
areas. These securities were an important part of the economic environment, providing public corporations with 
funds that allowed them to surpass competitors in their industries by an improved performance. After the 
1990s, the future of high yield financing experienced periods of decline, stagnation and also growth. However, 
something is certain: if a company has difficulties in obtaining capital, the same thing is happening with a 
country’s economy that experiences obstacles in its development and growth.  
The high yield market saw an explosive growth in 2005-2006, a bubble that was only foretelling the 
financial crisis that was about to come. Indeed, LBO-related high-yield issuance peaked at $51 million in 2007 
only to slump to zero in 2009, according to Standard & Poor’s LCD. 
The LBOs became an important part of the junk bonds’ story, because it is estimated that high yield 
securities may have accounted for as much as 25 to 30 percent of leveraged buyout financing (Yago, 1991). 
Throughout history and due to events that changed the way junk bonds or LBOs were perceived, we can affirm 
that high yield bonds were and are an essential part of most leveraged buyouts. 
After the crisis, the market started to regain its faded powers. It is expected that the high-yield and leveraged 
loan issuance volumes in 2014 to be similar to the record-high levels witnessed in 2013. It is expected a rising 
in treasury rates to be the main driver of returns in US and European high yield in 2014, with projected returns 
of 5% and 5.5%, respectively. Default rates are believed to remain contained, with exceptionally low levels in 
Europe. (Miller et al., 2013) 
The future of high yield and leveraged buyouts is going to be dominated by new corporate organizations that 
aim, through high yield financing, to create new opportunities and to innovate the social and economic 
environment. The definition of the future economy lies in balance. 
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